This paper examines the correlation between the concepts of sovereignty, human rights, and democracy in Russian legal and political debate, analyzing this correlation in the context of Russian philosophical discourse. It argues that sovereignty is often used as a powerful argument which allows the overruling of international humanitarian standards and the formal constitutional guarantees of human rights. This conflict between sovereignty and human rights also recurs in other countries, and many legal scholars demand the revision or even abandonment of the concept of sovereignty. In Russia this conflict is aggravated by some characteristic features of the traditional mentality which frequently favors statism and collective interests over individual ones, and by the state building a "power vertical" subordinating regional and other particularistic interests to the central power. These features and policies are studied in the context of the Slavophile-Westernizer philosophical divide. This divide reveals the pros and contras put forward by the Russian supporters of the isolationist (conservative) policy throughout contemporary history, and especially in the sovereignty debates in recent years. The Russian Constitution contains many declaratory statements about human rights and democracy, but their formulations are vague and have little concrete effect in court battles where the application of international humanitarian law is counterbalanced by the concerns of the protection of sovereignty. These concerns coincide with isolationist and authoritarian policies, which led in 2006 to their amalgamation into the concept of "sovereign democracy." This concept is considered in this paper to be a recurrence of the Russian conservative tradition. Even though the concept in its literal meaning has been abandoned by its author and supporters, most of its ideas are still on the cusp of the official political discourse which reproduces the pivotal axes of the Russian political philosophy of the 19 th century.
Introduction
The celebrated phrase used by the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court of Russia Valery Zor'kin in his polemic against the ECtHR "The limits of compromise", 2 demarcates one of the key trends in Russian legal policies in 2000s with regard to the relations between the Russian authorities and supranational organisations and international law in general. In Zor'kin's words, Russia shall decide on its own whether to cooperate with international courts and agencies or not, to take their values and principles in consideration or not, because it possesses sovereignty immunizing it from any pressure on such issues as human rights or democratization. This isolationist strategy was based on the so called "Westphalian" concept of sovereignty to which Zor'kin dedicated his apology in 2006. it will affect judicial practice in politically charged cases connected with human rights. In the following the conceptual roots of this idea are analyzed. This idea was first formulated several years ago under the title of "sovereign democracy" which "arose as a label for the governing team's thinking about Russia's path of political modernization". 5 In this context it will be important to first examine whether there are any normative restrictions in Russian constitutional law to prevent implementing this idea. To understand the philosophical background of the problem, we will then address the controversy between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers which reveals the main pros and contras for the Russian supporters of the (conservative) isolationist policy. 6 The word 'sovereignty' is one of those powerful words that work as an active force for social and political development. As Louis Henkin insists, "the meaning of sovereignty is confused and its uses are various, some of them unworthy, some destructive of human values… its application to 4 modern states has inevitably brought distortion and confusion." 7 In fact, in Western legal doctrine, international law has not always been accepted as binding states in the exercise of their political power. According to traditional positivist legal doctrine, there is no higher political entity above sovereign states. For this reason John Austin, the founding father of legal positivism, was reluctant to consider international law as "law properly so called" (insomuch as law is identified only with the commands of sovereign states), and agreed to accept it only as law in a figurative sense. 8 Whether international law has binding force on national policy, whether this force is derivative from the free choice of the concerned state, or it is mandatory and imposes absolute obligations on states irrespective of their acceptance -these debates form one of the focal points in legal theory of the 20 th century.
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These issues are especially pertinent in such legal matters as human rights or democracy: if the state is the only agency which creates law, it (or, in reality, the discretion of its agents) therefore stands above the law, and "rule of law" means a license for the state to rule over society with the help of any legal commands. No legal limits for state activities can be logically inferred in the framework of this approach to law, so that discourse on human rights and democracy serves as an ideological camouflage for various political games where the power-holders or their opponents play this card. Only the superiority of international law and the monist model of the relationship between international and domestic law can constitute an effective mechanism for the legal protection of individual liberties against the omnipotent state, as was persuasively argued by Hans Kelsen in his different works.
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In regard to these issues, Russia represents a particular case for studying the connection between the conceptualization of sovereignty and the practical steps taken by politicians and lawmakers in the field of human rights and democratic institutions. In the Western legal tradition the accent in a liberal democracy as a system is put on the protection of individual liberty. In Russian political debates references to "genuine" (antique, medieval) democracy the accent is put on the well-being of the polity, and not of the individuals as members of this polity. From this perspective, democracy can also be viewed as the instrument for protection of national rather than individual interests -this is the main thesis of the theory of "sovereign democracy" analyzed below, and reiterated by many influential politicians and judges in Russia.
Naturally, not only Russia confronts these issues in the changing world, and if we focus our attention on the Russian problem here, it does not imply a disregard of similar problems in the US or in the EU (which nevertheless are not as acute as in Russia due to the different political and legal contexts, as well to somewhat different cultural mindsets). For the sake of brevity we will skip a 7 Louis Henkin, "That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera", 68 5 comparative analysis of the impact that various concepts of sovereignty exercise on lawmaking and politics in different countries. 11 In the following we will analyze the traditional concept of state sovereignty largely accepted by some Russian senior judges, the challenges to this concept, the reactions to these challenges which have been expressed in the concept of "sovereign democracy", and some philosophical theories which underpin the particular attitude to sovereignty in Russia.
The treaty of Westphalia in 1648 marked the beginning of the contemporary doctrine of state sovereignty as an absolute unrestricted power. In the 16 th century Jean Bodin defined "sovereignty" as "absolute and perpetual power." The sovereign is one who exercises such power; the sovereign has the right to arbitrarily decide on any domestic issue. This understanding is still the dominant doctrine in the The Russian law faces a choice: international principles or national sovereignty
The idea of "the deconstruction of sovereignty" is discussed under the rubric of "globalization" which implies that there is a tendency towards a growing interconnection and interdependence between all countries and societies in the world. In the opinion of some theorists, this interconnection will result in the merger of all the national societies into one "global village". 18 Does Russia form a part of this globalized world, and if so, shall it therefore share the common standards and principles with the rest of the international community? Or can one still consider the national state as an independent actor freely deciding to what extent it will be subject to international law, and to dismiss the globalization discussion because of its ideological nature? The answer to these questions are It is not surprising that when facing criticism against unjust laws and court decisions, some
Russian lawyers are tempted to look for a defense in the traditional concept of sovereignty as an absolute unrestricted power which is incompatible with the idea of the objectivity of international law. 29 The practical underpinnings of this defense are easily traceable, as this position allows for the justification of unlimited public interventions into individual liberties: there are no limits to sovereign power in the traditional concept of sovereignty where sovereignty is defined as unaccountable. Here one could make an allusion to the remarkable characterization that Martti Koskenniemi gave to the traditional theory of sovereignty of the 19 th century regarding it as "especially useful for diplomats and practitioners, not least because it seemed to offer such compelling rhetoric for the justification of most varied kinds of State action." 30 The concept of sovereignty can be attractive simply as a tool for legitimizing the disciplinary power of the state, 31 which is seen as independent of endorsement by international law and immune to any critics "from abroad".
In its turn, this "immunization" leads to the legitimizing of the discretionary power of governors and judges who decide on the "limits of compromise" concerning human rights. These limits are to be defined by the judiciary when delimiting which human rights are to be protected, what the content of the protected rights are, and by the politicians when deciding whether the people are "ripe" enough to sovereignty" and its development into the concept of "sovereign democracy" to defend Russia against "Western moral imperialism".
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Putatively, this official rhetoric meets legal constraints in the text of the Constitution.
Justification of the supremacy of the international standards of human rights can be found in Article 17
of the Constitution which provides that human rights in Russia are recognized and ensured "according to the generally recognized principles and norms of international law." Nonetheless, for many observers this reference to international law appears to be a mere statement of policy. 39 A strictly formalist reading of Article 15 of the Constitution (see above) can be interpreted as: only the treaties to which the state conceded its sovereign will are mandatory for the judiciary, the parliament and the government; and the not-ratified common norms and principles of international law have only a persuasive effect. 40 From this perspective one can conclude that the standards of human rights protection and the principles of democracy in certain circumstances can be abandoned for the sake of the protection of sovereignty under Article 4 of the Constitution. This conclusion is confirmed by Article 55 of the Constitution which sets out that individual rights and freedoms may be restricted in order to protect the foundations of the constitutional system, the security of the country, or the security of the government. Can Article 2 of the Constitution, pursuant to which human rights are declared to be the highest priority in Russia, can provide a defense against such a reading? Again, the wording of this latter constitutional provision does not define the scope of the protected human rights: Does it refer only to those mentioned in ratified treaties, or those which are internationally recognized, or even those which can be classified as "natural rights" and not fixed in any treaty or convention? The first approach preserves the force of the sovereignty argument, as ratification implies that state concedes the application of an international treaty on its territory. The second is problematic in view of the afore-mentioned ambiguities of the Constitution, which does not explicitly restate what shall be the balance between the concerns of human rights and those of sovereignty. At first glance, the last natural justice reading may seem favorable to universal humanitarian standards. Nonetheless, in the consequent logic of its implementation it can also result in discarding "internationally recognized human rights" which might be put aside in order to give a way to the "natural rights" found by the courts in the traditional values and patterns.
A typical example of this latter approach can be seen in the attitude of the courts to gays and lesbians who are prosecuted for expressing their opinions. There is no need to argue that such prosecution stands in contradiction to international standards of human rights. Although, in Russia this prosecution is justified from both theoretical and practical standpoints with reference not only to the traditional family, gender roles, and religious commands, but also to the sovereignty argument: to defend the Russian society from the West. 41 The precedential judgment of the ECtHR in Alekseyev v. 
Russia of October
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(which, at least, in the practice of the ECtHR implies the "social equivalence" of different sexual orientations) and the "traditional natural law recognized in Russian culture". 44 This confirms that discussions about the respective force of international, constitutional and natural law has some important implications for the protection of human rights. Is it admissible that human rights are protected differently depending on the extent the concerned state has agreed to follow international humanitarian standards? Does it undermine the very idea of human rights as "supralegal law" (Gustav Radbruch) standing above state laws, the discretion of the state government, and the shield of sovereignty? An affirmative answer is apparent in the perspective of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which plainly states that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty"
(Article 2). From this perspective human rights are conceptually independent of the sovereign will of particular states. As Jack Donnelly defines it, "human rights are simply the rights that one has because one is human." 45 Although, it is not this assertion which gains the upper hand in contemporary Russian justice. 46 As shown above, the most powerful counterargument is that of sovereignty; and this argument has more effect in Russia than in the Western Europe due to particular historical and cultural factors.
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Sovereign democracy as a philosophical legacy?
If one inquires into the theoretical underpinning of the official attitude to sovereignty, one can see certain traditions of legal thinking which have been interiorized at the very basic levels of culture, and naturally during legal education. Discussing the official position on the sovereignty issue in Russia, McGovern and Willerton find the main sources of this posture in "the Russian political philosophical tradition emphasizing statism, collectivism, and national sovereignty that has long 44 Waiting until the law becomes effective, lawyers ironically tried to discern the criteria according to which "traditional sex" could be differentiated from "non-traditional". Naturally, it is not sex and gender issues which are at the stake with this law. The motivation letter which explains the reasons for adopting this law, paradigmatically sets out that "Family, motherhood and childhood in the traditional meaning inherited from the preceding generations constitute such values that procure an uninterrupted chain of generations and that are the condition for preserving and development of the multinational Russian people." (see the text of this letter at: http://www.rg.ru/2013/02/04/koap-homo-site-dok.html). The matter is therefore about the values considered to be basic to the Russian legal order, intended to protect the sovereign rights of the Russian people. 15 to the interplay between the crafty politicians and the naïve people cynically manipulated by mass media, 54 or than the reiteration of the idea of the reappearance of the Soviet ideology. 55 The emphasis on the collectivity which superposes the individuality has often been mentioned as one of the key elements of Russian culture. This cultural peculiarity is seen as promoting egalitarian values and community fellowship. For Margret Mead it means to shift the emphasis away from the solitary communicant to the congregational experience of community. 56 This shift for Russian idealrealist philosophy does not result in the annihilation of individuality for the sake of universality, but ideally aims at a fuller development of the personality which can exist only as a part of the totality (the people, the Church, the rural community (Mir [World] ), etc.). The gap between this ideal dimension and the historical reality of the domination of the collective over the individual for Berdyaev, Vladimir
Soloviev and many other Russian intellectuals is explained by Orthodox religiosity where the individual existence is justified solely in the eschatological perspective of salvation which, in its turn, is possible only through a collective action. 57 This philosophical hypothesis of the union between the social and the individual could easily divert Russian thinkers from the "Western" model of democracy whose main function is to check the behavior of government against the people. The idea of the spiritual union of the people and government is undergirded by the "antique model" of democracy where state (polity) and people should work in a "symphony" (the old Byzantine idea penetrated into Russia in the early Middle Ages) to safeguard the totality from disintegration. 58 The organic relationship between the people and the government presupposes that they are spiritually united to accomplish a "national idea" (another powerful slogan in the vocabulary of the Russian conservators from Sergei Uvarov, Ivan Il'jin to Vladimir Putin 59 ), this national idea holding up the collective concern for national sovereignty in the guise of "sovereign democracy".
Two major stages can be identified in the discussions about sovereignty in Russia. The first is connected with the "failing" model of federalism introduced in the Constitution of 1993. 60 The
Constitutional Court has step-by-step annihilated the concept of shared sovereignty (formerly 16 supposed to belong both to the federation and to its members), holding invalid the differently formulated sovereignty clauses in the regional constitutions; these steps were accompanied by the centralization reforms launched by Putin during his first presidency. 61 Once the integrity of the country was restored in mid-2000, the debates took another direction; this time, about the limits of independence of Russia in the sphere of international law and inside international organizations (the UN, the WTO, etc.). The controversies between Russia and European institutes (the PACE, the ECtHR, etc.) in such politically engaged cases as those of YUKOS, the Chechen and the Georgian campaigns, the Magnitsky case led to a reassessment of the attitude of Russian politicians and senior judges towards the standards of international human rights. The criticism was not against the standards as such but against the 'irresponsible behavior' of international organizations. 62 This criticism was not directed against "the International", its target was "the Western" with its pretention to supplant the International. Independence from the Western influence was seen in this aspect as the basic precondition for the normal development of Russia (in the sense of a development which would be congruent with certain cultural norms inherent to Russian civilization). In the official ideology it was the concept of sovereign democracy which was principally designed to protect Russian national sovereignty against the "Western liberal-democratic ideology".
The main ideologist of this idea is Vladislav Surkov, who in 2006 was the deputy head of the Administration of the Russian president. The rhetoric around sovereign democracy was developed by Surkov with reference to the set of ideas introduced by the famous neoconservative Francis Fukuyama.
The most impressive contribution to the debates was made during the Round Table "The forces. There are three basic conceptual premises of sovereign democracy: sovereignty legally prevails over (liberal) democracy; one can correctly balance the sovereign rights of the state with individual human rights because there is an "organic relationship" between the people and the government, and because an individual is nothing more than a part of the collective; the democratic tradition shall not be introduced to Russia from abroad but shall be found in the Russian thousand-year culture of statehood which is based on the communitarian traditions. Individual interests cannot stand above societal ones, and in the case of a conflict, the rights of certain individuals can be sacrificed on the altar of national, collective rights (i.e. the rights of the people/nation to be sovereign -politically, economically, culturally and in many other aspects). The main political conclusion of this doctrine is the connection between maintaining state sovereignty and the preservation of the state control, including the introduction of a strong state ideology to insulate political power from international criticism. The primary task of this conservative ideology is to secure the country's integrity, which requires promptly averting any threat coming from the West and from its insiders in Russia. 66 Russia must move toward democracy cautiously, under the permanent parental control of the government. 67 It is questionable whether this political concept undermines the universal idea of democracy, 68 and whether there are any universalities in the multicultural postmodern world, but such a question would redirect us to the vast philosophical debates which are beyond the scope of this work. In the context of the present article it suffices to point out the main philosophical implication of this position: the collective interest takes precedent over individual interests. 69 Sovereign democracy was discussed for several months, and after about a year of discussions it fell into desuetude. 70 The most important discussion took place at the Faculty of Philosophy of Saint discrepancies and paradoxes of sovereign democracy. 71 This philosophical critique (almost all the philosophers were united by a deep skepticism toward this concept) was echoed by political leaders. Surely, we do not insist that the new rhetoric of sovereign democracy entirely repeats the old conservative schemes of the Slavophiles -this proposal would mean an evident oversimplification of the problem. Nil sub sole novum, and this is true also for political ideologies. But these ideologies never grow in an empty space, and are almost always loosely rooted in the previous debates. In our opinion, this is the case of sovereign democracy which is deeply rooted in the Russian traditionalist philosophy (both religious and secular) of the end of the 19 th century, and which at the same time transmits the old intellectual tradition into contemporary political debates. An analysis of the philosophical quality of the concept of sovereign democracy was not our task here (a very good philosophical assessment is given in the discussion mentioned in footnote 71 above), neither was our concern to criticize isolationist/traditionalist ideologies. Our objective was rather to show that a careful examination of the political rhetoric in Russia requires transcending (though not a complete abandoning) the usual explanatory schemes formulated in terms of interplay of political (economical, corporate, etc.) interests and the transition of the Soviet ideological legacy. An investigation into the philosophical dimension of this rhetoric can help reveal a larger hidden cultural framework into which this rhetoric can be inscribed, no matter whether the concerned political actors were aware of this framework or not. Today Surkov's concept can already be regarded as obsolete, and its author has lost almost all of his influence -not only intellectual, but also political (after resigning from the government in May, 2013). But his "sovereign democracy" shows the inheritance of the philosophical ideas in the Russian political discourse, and can be regarded as one of the intermediaries which changed the old ideas into the new realities.
Conclusion
This short analysis draws several parallel lines between the reasoning of the Slavophiles and of modern Russian conservatives on the issues of democracy and human rights. Both condemn Western democracy and liberalism for their lack of spirituality and for their accentuated individualism, and stress the priority of the collective over the individual. Human rights in this perspective cannot gain the upper hand over the state laws. These laws take their origin in popular national sovereignty and convey the will of the people; at the same time, the pedigree of international law is obscure and is suspected to be influenced by the alien powers. This way of thinking stands in contrast to the constitutional provisions about the priority of human rights and of international law over domestic laws (Articles 15, 17 of the Constitution); however the imperfect formulation of the Russian constitution allows the 21 judiciary to circumvent these formulations using them and the principles of international law as redundant arguments. The concept of sovereign democracy by Surkov is not widely discussed nowadays, the author himself has abandoned it, and the Kremlin ideologists seem to be reluctant to restate this concept. 83 Nevertheless, one can suggest that the emergence of this concept was not an accidental fact and can be considered as a recurrence of Russian conservatism. During the last two centuries similar concepts have often been used in propaganda. In imperial Russia it was the case of the celebrated formula of Count Uvarov "Pravoslavie, Samoderzhavie, Narodnost'" (Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Popular Democracy 84 ) which became one of the cornerstones of the official ideology legitimizing autocracy through references to Russian communitarian traditions. It was also the case of the "soviet (also socialist or council) democracy" which legitimized the dictatorship of the proletariat, or in fact -the authoritarian (sometimes even totalitarian) rule of the Communist Party in Soviet
Russia. "Sovereign democracy" therefore can be seen not as an "invention" but as a "reinvention" of one of the models of official political discourse.
Reiterating this idea of a "democracy à la russe" by political leaders and senior judges (with or without reference to sovereign democracy) conveys to Russians several ideological messages about the correlation between individual and collective rights. We can discern three principal messages among them. The first says that the sources of sovereignty are found in state power itself, not in society or in the international community. This message is translated by a simple syllogism: given that the Russian people are the only bearer of sovereignty (Article 3 of the Constitution), and given that the people do not realize their will directly (except during elections and referendums) and delegate its realization to the government, it follows that the government is entitled (on behalf of the people) to take any measures to protect the popular and national (these aspects are hardly differentiated in Russian political science) sovereignty indispensable for survival of the people. Therefore, no international courts or agencies can interfere with the activities of the government or criticize even based on humanitarian or other standards.
Second, the 'correct' way of thinking about sovereignty allows the Russian state and society to survive in the international community which is friendly only in appearance but in reality is a conglomerate of envious states and corporations which search to take hold of the national resources 22 belonging to the Russian people, thus depriving it of its sovereignty. 85 The main function of the state is therefore to detect the ideological dangers coming from the West in the guise of the liberal rhetoric for "idealization of pseudo-objective values", and to avert these dangers through dismissing the malevolent criticism of the West. Human rights and democracy are merely a pretext for the West to interfere with Russian internal affairs and to take control over its sovereignty.
Fear of social and political unpredictability, and traditional communitarism create an atmosphere favorable to the isolationism predicated by the officials as 'a separate way of development' of Russia.
In this light the protection of sovereignty at any cost can easily be justified as conditio sine qua non for the survival of the Russian people. In the opinion of some authors, such historical experience contributed to the formation of a "spirit of misadventure in the public sphere" in the Russian culture 86 which results in the passive abstention and mistrust in any kind of political discourse including that about democracy or human rights. Given this traditional inertia of Russians in political issues, the government may act independently of public opinion as long as Russians are not "ripe" enough to be widely engaged in political deliberation. Even if such conclusions are highly questionable, they can at least, partly explain the objectives of the "mobilization strategy" employed by the authorities to urge intellectuals to be vigilant towards the Western values. If there is some mistrust in the great narratives about human rights among some of the Russians, the rhetoric about sovereignty can increase this distrust and reinforce the legitimacy of the authorities, otherwise challenged by the Western critic.
Thirdly, the West goes in the wrong direction admitting the paradigm of globalization where sovereignty allegedly loses its importance. Abandoning sovereignty in favor of softer international regulation would lead to the rule of transnational corporations and oligarchs. Russia shall not follow this new paradigm as it does not conform to the Constitution and the laws of Russia (they are evidently based on the Westphalian model of sovereignty), and is destructive for society. This old idea of the "decaying West" offered by the Slavophiles and appreciated by the Soviet regime ("decaying capitalism"), plays its role also in dismissing the globalization arguments ("it can be true for the decayed West but not for Russia which keeps faithful to its statist traditions"). The globalization dangers could come true if Russia engaged itself in cosmopolitan culture and would admit the universality of democratic or humanitarian standards, destroying thereby its national uniqueness.
These arguments, reiterated by Putin and other conservative politicians nowadays, had already been widely expanded on in the 19 th century. Therefore, such engagement can be dangerous and Russia should keep a safe distance from the legal ideology promoted by international courts and organizations. 87 In these three messages sovereignty is mostly understood as external independence, that is, the integrity and autonomy of the state as regards other states and the international community. In these discussions about "untouchable sovereignty" there is a lack of distinction among the sovereignty of a people, of a nation, of a state; sovereignty is uncritically used in all meanings for the same ideological purpose. Many ideologists of this concept are at a loss to understand whether "sovereign democracy" is different from sovereignty or is an integral part of sovereignty. 88 The 'sovereignty debates' are not separated from the question about a monist/dualist foundation of the legal order; ideas about the priority of international law can easily (but erroneously) be considered as a threat to sovereignty. A distinction is also missing between the concept of sovereignty and that of the binding force of human rights (do they depend on a state's endorsement, on international legal standards, or on natural laws of reasonableness and sociability?).
Analyzing the official discourse, one can notice that these formal questions become more and more important for high-ranking Russian lawyers. Several examples symbolize this trend. Among them the demise of the idea of sovereign democracy, which is no longer supported by politicians with a legal background, the evolution of Zor'kin's ideas on sovereignty, 89 from apology of the Westphalian system to the search for the new contemporary models, and other examples, including the accentuated interest in contemporary Western legal philosophy. 90 From this standpoint, one cannot predict the future development of human rights and democracy in Russia, nor can one undeniably qualify the position of the Russian authorities as anti-humanitarian and contravening to the standards of democracy. 91 As Vladimir Bibikhin, the contemporary Russian philosopher of law, insisted the
